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THE COST OF PURITY: USE OF THE EFFLUENT
CHARGE IN WATER QUALITY CONTROL AND
MANAGEMENT
ANITA L. MORSE*
How clean is clean enough can only be answered in terms of
how much we are willing to pay and how soon we seek success.
The effects of such decisions on our domestic economic con-
cerns-jobs, prices, foreign competition-require explicit and
rigorous analysis to permit us to maintain a healthy economy
while we seek a healthy environment. It is essential that we
have both. It is simplistic to seek ecological perfection at the
cost of bankrupting the very taxpaying enterprises which must
pay for the social advances the nation seeks.'
INTRODUCTION-THE EFFLUENT CHARGE CONCEPT
The cost of pure water has captured public attention as a part of
increasing concern with the quality of our environment. This concern is
exemplified at the federal level by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972.2 States and municipalities are also seriously
attempting to meet the problems of expanding water needs and scarce
water resources. Laws, however, have not solved the major difficulty of
maximizing the beneficial uses of water-financing the cost of purity.'
Federal grants are inadequate and appropriations do not match the
goals of federal legislation. Taxpayer resistance limits the efforts of
state and local governments. Yet the cost of purity is another important
economic cost that the consumer must weigh in balancing his budget.
How much are we willing to spend for pure water? Is it possible to
finance the cost of pure water in such a way that each consumer will
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The research assistance of Paul
Vesper, J.D. is acknowledged.
I. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE SECOND AN-
NUAL REPORT xi (1971) (President's message).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972).
3. The six New England states and three Middle Atlantic states expended 58.9 percent of
the total amount spent on water quality control in fiscal year 1969-70. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 157-200 (1972). State
funding for state water quality agencies ranged from a low of $27,700 in North Dakota to a high
of $4,384,000 in California for the year 1971. In 1972 the amounts were $31,100 and $4,934,000
respectively. Id. at 198-99.
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receive a cost benefit that will make his economic outlay equitable and
acceptable? It is submitted that the effluent charge provides an eco-
nomic method of cost assessment acceptable to consumers and capable
of producing adequate revenue to achieve water quality control and
management.
Water use classification is now determined by the status of the user
(i.e., whether the rightholder is a "riparian" user or "appropriations"
user), or according to the classification of the water itself (i.e., whether
the water is "ground water" or "surface water"), or on the basis of
similar artificial distinctions.' Despite these convenient legal categories,
nature insists upon following its own system. Purification of our nation's.
waters can only be achieved by transcending legal distinctions that are
not in accord with reality. Any discussion of water pollution control and
water quality management must include all water sources and water
uses.' It must be kept in mind, therefore, that the effluent charge recog-
nizes these distinctions and that its application is not restricted within
the confines of current legal terminology.
Essentially, the effluent charge system attempts to solve the
problem economists refer to as the external diseconomy of water
pollution: as long as water is considered a "free good," many users will
not internalize the cost of their own water use; instead, these costs will
4. It has been noted that
[e]xperts at law have contributed to isolationism by setting up distinct "classes" of water,
which have no sound scientific basis, and by formulating unlike rules and hypotheses for
each class. This classification commonly includes:
1. Surface water in watercourses-rivers, creeks, and natural streams in
general.
2. Ground water in "defined underground streams"-imited to the most
obvious occurrences, because the burden of proof is usually placed on the person
claiming existence of this class of water. Examples are the water in caverns or in
tongues of gravel and sand that underlie stream channels but in turn are underlain
and bordered by impermeable rock.
3. "Percolating" water-that is, all other ground water.
4. "Diffused" surface water-that is, water on the land surface but not in
water-courses or lakes.
5. Springs-natural discharge points for ground water, and therefore de-
rived from class 2 or class 3.
Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is Their Future Common Ground?, in WATER
RESOURCES AND THE LAW 9 (University of Michigan Law School 1958).
5. J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY
AND POLICY 36-42 (1960).
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THE EFFLUENT CHARGE
be passed along to other users.' The effluent charge system avoids this
inequity. The system has been described as
a levy on a party for using the environment by discharging an
effluent into it, and depriving someone else of the use he would
like to make of the environment. While the concept is some-
times called an effluent tax, or an emission tax, this nomencla-
ture is not strictly correct. A tax is a general charge with no
immediate quid pro quo for the payer; thus there is a tax on
tobacco and on income. A charge by the post office or for
grazing on government land is another thing, however. It is a
fee for a service rendered or a damage sustained.7
The quid pro quo referred to above helps insure that water users inter-
nalize the cost of their own pollution.
Implementation of such a system is admittedly not a simple task.
One problem encountered is determining the cost of pollution-what it
is worth at different stages of use and to whom-based on a theory of
cost-benefit analysis.' A further difficulty arises in attempting to impose
such a system upon a legal structure based on faulty assumptions as to
the nature of water.' Integration of the effluent charge into the Ameri-
can framework will be discussed at a later point. ° At this juncture it
seems helpful to illustrate the elements of an effluent charge program
with a discussion of the German system.
THE EFFLUENT CHARGE SYSTEM IN THE RUHR VALLEY
The Ruhr system known as the Genossenschaften consists of eight
associations which operate a regional system for waste disposal and
water supply." It includes a method of distributing the costs of water
quality operations by levying charges on the effluents discharged in each
region. The main features of the system are explained as follows:
6. Ostrom, The Water Economy and its Organization, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES 376-96 (D. Thompson ed. 1972).
7. J. HITE, H. MACAULAY, J. STEPP & B. YANDLE JR., THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 109-10 (1972).
8. Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decision, in POLITICS,
POLICY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES 85-87 (D. Thompson ed. 1972).
9. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 71-80 infra and accompanying text.
II. There is a sparsity of English language text on the Ruhr system. A good general descrip-
tion is available in Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District, in COMPARISONS IN RE-
SOURCE MANAGEMENT 142-71 (H. Jarret ed. 1961). There is, however, a vast amount of German
text material well catalogued in A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOM-
ICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 237-38 (1968).
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Very briefly put, the Emschergenossenschaft procedure is
roughly as follows: (1) There is estimated first an amount of
dilution water necessary to dilute a given amount of waste
materials subject to sedimentation (no distinction is made be-
tween organic and inorganic material) in order that they not
[sic] be destructive to fish life under the conditions of the area.
An amount of dilution water required by such materials in a
given effluent is then computed on that basis. (2) An analo-
gous calculation is made for materials subject to biochemical
degradation (and which therefore exert an oxygen demand)
but which are not subject to sedimentation. (3) The amount of
dilution required under specified conditions in order that the
toxic material in the effluent not [sic] kill fish is computed by
direct experimentation. (4) Certain side calculations having to
do with water depletion, heat in effluent, etc., are made. The
derived dilution requirements are added together for the ef-
fluent and form a basis for comparison with all other effluents.
In principle, costs are distributed in accordance with the pro-
portion of aggregate dilution requirements accounted for by
the specific effluent. One might say that this procedure is based
on a particular physical objective, i.e. [sic] not to "kill fish."
However, the result of the method is used as an "index" of
pollution even when effluents are discharged to streams in
which lower or higher standards prevail than needed to pre-
serve fish life.
The Ruhrverband [a Ruhr River association] method is
also based on a physical objective but on a different one ....
Again, the details are described elsewhere. In essence, however,
the method is founded on the concept that toxic wastes by
killing bacteria and slowing down the rate at which wastes are
degraded have somewhat the same effect on treatment plant
effluents and the level of BOD [biochemical oxygen demand]
in streams as an increase in the amount of degradable material.
On the basis of laboratory tests, an equivalence is formed so
that toxic as well as degradable wastes are converted into a
standard unit-a "population equivalent BOD."' 1
Once costs are determined under the above method they are as-
12. A. Kneese, Water Quality Management by Regional Authorities in the Ruhr Area with
Special Emphasis on the Role of Cost Assessment 23-24, Dec. 27, 1962 (paper presented before
the Regional Science Association meeting).
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sessed pursuant to well-defined guidelines. Assessments are based on the
principle
that both the cost of pollution abatement and the value of
direct as well as indirect benefits derived by a member from
the execution, maintenance, and operation of specific installa-
tions of the Association are assessable. In the Emschergenos-
senschaft, enterprises other than mining are obligated in the
roster only if their contributions equal or exceed 0.5 percent of
the annual budget. If they do not, the member district in which
a given enterprise is situated is assessed. Association assess-
ment then gives way to local taxation.' 3
A further important aspect of the system is its requirement of
mandatory membership in each association. It is provided that munici-
pal and rural administrations as well as industrial enterprises that dis-
charge their waters into rivers and streams have a voice in the associa-
tion's operation. Fairness is further assured by a built-in safety mecha-
nism which allows judicial review of all assessments. 4
Much of the system's success can be attributed to its regional orien-
tation. As such it employs various quality and quantity control methods
including waste treatment, collective treatment plants, diversion of the
flow of streams to promote purity and enhance waste sterilization, use
of artificial recharge of underground aquifers, and specialized use of
certain streams for waste-effluent carriage. Wastes are then specially
cleaned in a treatment plant before they are allowed to enter the Rhine,
of which the Ruhr area streams are tributary. 5
The various economic and procedural concepts of the
Genossenschaften are detailed at length elsewhere. 6 For the purposes
of this article, it is sufficient to note the following limitations. First, the
system is intended to serve a regional water supply. Second, the system
entails a comprehensive plan that includes waste disposal, water supply,
flood damage reduction, and land drainage control through planning,
design, construction, and operation of water quality management facili-
13. Fair, Pollution Abatement in the Ruhr District, in COMPARISONS IN RESOURCE,
MANAGEMENT 152 (H. Jarret ed. 1961).
14. Id. at 153.
15. H. BANKS, E. CLEARY & A. KNEESE, DEVELOPMENT OF A WATER QUALITY MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAM FOR THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN 10 (1963) (report to the Delaware River Basin
Commission).
16. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY,
INSTITUTIONS 143-79 (1968).
1973]
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ties and wastewater treatment plants. Third, the system contemplates
compulsory membership and participation privileges commensurate
with the amount of contribution to the association's expenses. Fourth,
the system is based on the principle that costs of constructing and
operating the system should be borne both by members who are respon-
sible for the effluent discharges and by those who benefit from the use
of the water. Fifth and most important, the system includes strict regu-
latory supervision by the state.
It should be observed that the system necessarily ignores straight
marginal cost pricing in favor of a charge that provides an incentive to
preserve scarce resources. The charge levied by this regional system on
individual waste discharges serves two purposes. It serves as an equita-
ble means of assessing the cost and distributing the benefits of the
regulation and treatment of stream waters. More importantly, it pro-
vides an incentive for polluters to reduce waste loads through process
adjustment, recovery practices and pretreatment. 7 This latter point is
emphasized because it illustrates the importance of using the effluent
charge, not as a "permit to pollute," but rather as an incentive to
prevent pollution and encourage potential polluters to curtail waste
loads.1"
The decision to implement a similar plan in the United States must
necessarily depend on the existence of common features that would
make the system acceptable and workable on a practical level. Although
no system exists in this country comparable to the Genossenschaften,
there have been certain programs which merit attention. Before turning
to the salient features of the water control structure in the United States
generally, a few of these programs will be discussed briefly.
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
At present there are at least four programs, ranging from the state
to the federal level, which contain characteristics of the effluent charge.
The state of California, and more recently Vermont, have some form
of this system. On the Eastern Seaboard a regional approach was taken
in the Delaware River Basin Compact. Finally, the most promising (but
as yet untested) approach is that envisioned by the Federal Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972.
17. DELAWARE RIVER BASIN REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
18. One writer appears to conceive the effluent charge as a sanction to be placed upon
industries for their pollution practices rather than as an integral part of a water resource program
that affects every user and those receiving benefits. See Grady, Effluent Charges and the Industrial
Water Pollution Problem, 5 NEW ENGc. L. REV. 61 (1969).
[Vol. 7
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1973], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss2/2
THE EFFLUENT CHARGE
California
California has been a leader in legislative control of water re-
sources. 9 In 1967 the basic organization for water pollution and quality
control was modified by the creation of the State Water Resources
Control Board and the integration of water quality and quantity control
at the state level. 2 The reorganization recognized the need for a compre-
hensive program of water resource planning on a level allowing maximi-
zation of benefits on both the social and economic levels through cost
savings and optimum use of resources.
A study panel report2 I recommends certain changes in existing
water quality control legislation in California, stating that a major prob-
lem is the financing of needed improvements in present waste treatment
systems.2 2 The report takes cognizance of the inadequacies of federal
and state financing as well as impediments encountered in local govern-
ment financing; it recommends that
[tihe state board should be authorized to require the establish-
ment of sewer service charges by public agencies applying for
federal grant funds when such agencies cannot otherwise ade-
quately finance the local agency share of the proposed waste
treatment facility?.
It is asserted that such charges will result in a better allocation of
resources because each contributor to the pollution load pays his own
share; such a system should encourage wiser economic decisions on the
part of polluters.24 In support of this recommendation, the report cites
the San Francisco Bay-Delta Study (covering a 12 county area) which
indicates that 55.4 percent of the revenue for water waste disposal be-
tween 1962 and 1967 has come from sewer service charges.25 The report
concludes that sewer service charges are advantageous because:
1. Costs are distributed amongst the producers of waste who
cause the problem.
2. Local property taxes are not thereby increased.
19. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1004-07 (West 1971).
20. Id. §§ 174-89.
21. STUDY PANEL TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, REC-
OMMENDED CHANGES IN WATER QUALITY CONTROL 2-3 (1969).
22. Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id.
25. Id.
19731
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3. There is increased flexibility in financing, with the result
that rates can be established to reflect local situations."
Vermont
Compared to the California system, Vermont's experiment in this
area is limited and hardly achieves the goals of an effluent charge sys-
tem. Vermont enacted a water pollution control act which provides for
pollution permits (and charges polluters for such privileges) when alter-
native waste disposal methods are shown to be impracticable. 7 It is
provided that pollution charges will be adopted which "shall have the
purpose of providing an economic incentive for temporary pollution
permit holders to comply with the requirements, conditions, and restric-
tions of their permits."2 The charge is based on the damage to other
water users caused by the "degrading effect of various types of waste
in varying volumes and frequencies . 29
The above formula fails to force the polluter to internalize costs.
The annual per person equivalent charge may not be greater than
$30-an insult, at the very least, to cost-benefit analysts.30 In effect it
forces the polluter to pay a bribe (and a pitifully small one at that) to
other users for the privilege of polluting the waters. It provides no
incentive to seek alternative methods of waste control or production.
The Delaware River Basin Compact
On the Eastern Seaboard, water resources management, viewed as
a total program of quality and quantity allocation and control, is a new
concept, although state and federal interest is growing.', In this region,
efforts to deal efficiently with the problems of water resources have been
hampered, in theory, by common law doctrines governing riparian
water use and, in fact, by an absence of real water scarcity. Little
understanding of the problems involved in water quality control has
existed in the community and the courts. At present, the growing popu-
lation and the corresponding increase in water consumption (in the
broadest sense of domestic, recreational, agricultural and industrial
uses) are producing a scarcity of water resources and are reducing the
26. Id.
27. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 911(a) (1969).
28. Id. § 912a(a)(e)(I).
29. Id. § 912a(e)(2).
30. Id.
31 I. See, e.g., F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION,
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE (1968); Maloney & Ausness, Water Quality Control: A Modern Ap-
proach to State Regulation, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 28 (1970).
[Vol. 7
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quality of water because of misuse and pollution of rivers, lakes and
streams.
The Delaware River Basin Compact 2 is one of the few efforts
toward creating an integrated water quality management program on
the Eastern Seaboard. Impetus for the Compact resulted from the stra-
tegic location of the Delaware River Basin. The basin serves Delaware,
New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, and therefore must satisfy
the domestic, industrial, agricultural and recreational demands of one
of the most important industrial and population centers in the United
States.
In July 1963 a report to the Delaware River Basin Commission33
stated that the Compact envisioned a multipurpose water resource plan
that would bring the greatest benefits and produce the most service for
the public welfare. The report explored the problem of multipurpose
uses that may be prejudicial to each other (such as water supply and
recreation as against assimilation of waste effluents) and suggested that
the benefits and costs of alternative uses must be carefully weighed. It
concluded that maximum net benefit
requires, among other things, the systematic formulation of
effluent standards and/or a system of charges based upon
quantity and quality of waste discharges to achieve the neces-
sary coordination of alternatives.34
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197211
constitute the most ambitious and encompassing legislation in the area
of water purity to date. The Act requires that water quality be brought
to a standard capable of protecting fish and wildlife and providing
recreational benefits by the year 1983.36 It is further provided that
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States
be eliminated by 1985. 31 It is anticipated that these goals will be accom-
plished through close cooperation between the federal government and
the various states.3 8
Important features of the Act may be summarized as follows. Dis-
charge permits for dumping pollutants into the navigable waters of the
32. Pub. L. No. 87-328 (Sept. 27, 1961).
33. See note 15 supra.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972).
36. Id. § 101(a)(2).
37. Id. § 101(a)(I).
38. Id. § 101(b).
1973]
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United States will be issued under the auspices of the Environmental
Protection Agency." The states are required to submit for federal ap-
proval water quality standards and implementation plans for intrastate
and interstate waters based on point discharge effluent limitations.
Federal approval will be based on the state's adherence to federal inter-
state water standards as set forth in the Act or on promise of future
compliance, evidenced by a continuing plan." The continuing plan will
provide the working guidelines for long-range goals and is a prerequisite
to a state pollution permit system.4
Licensing pollution is, then, a part of both state and federal pollu-
tion control programs. This becomes more obvious when the provisions
on implementation of standards43 are read in conjunction with the pro-
visions for grants for construction of treatment works." Under the latter
provisions it is provided that
[wiaste treatment management plans and practices shall pro-
vide for the application of the best practicable waste treatment
technology before any discharge into receiving waters, includ-
ing reclaiming and recycling of water, and confined disposal of
pollutants so they will not migrate to cause water or other
environmental pollution and shall provide for consideration of
advanced waste treatment techniques. 5
Read together, the provisions of the Act may be said to acknowl-
edge the integral problems of water quality and management, accept
cost-benefit criteria as a guideline for pollution control goals, and re-
quire the internalization of costs by the imposition of charges on water
users. If fully implemented,47 the impact of the Act should be consider-
able.
39. Id. §§ 201-12; § 511.
40. Id. §§ 301-03.
41. Id. § 303(e)(3).
42. Id. § 402(b).
43. Id. § 303.
44. Id. §§ 201-12.
45. Id. § 201(b).
46. SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
47. The Act was unanimously passed by Congress over President Nixon's veto. The Admin-
istration had called for $6 billion to be spent over a three year period. Congress, however, appropri-
ated $24.6 billion. The President then announced that he would spend only $5 billion of the $11
billion allotted for the next two years. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1972, § 4, at 1.
[Vol. 7
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As the above survey of systems indicates, the effluent charge plan,
in some form, has been offered as a possible solution for the successful
creation and operation of a water resources control program. Little
progress, however, has been made in implementing such an effluent
charge system in multipurpose water use programs. Imposition of such
a system depends, in large part, on whether it can be adapted to present
systems on a practical level. The remainder of this article will explore
this problem.
VARIATIONS OF THE CHARGE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
There are two major financing systems now used in the United
States to effect water pollution control or water resources allocation.
These are the imposition of user charges by municipalities and the use
of tax incentives to encourage installation of water pollution control
devices.
The user charge resembles an effluent charge in that it has manda-
tory aspects and can be used as a part of a comprehensive plan for water
resources control. On the other hand, tax incentives (such as property
tax relief or fast depreciation write-offs) depend on the voluntary action
of private individuals to construct and operate pollution control facili-
ties.
The use of tax incentives is considered only briefly here because of
the lack of direct relationship between a scheme such as the effluent
charge, which contemplates regulatory supervision and mandatory as-
sociation, and one based on voluntary cooperation. It is the opinion of
this writer that the basic failure of the tax incentive plan is that it merely
gives industry a greater return on an already profitable investment, since
the original expenditure for pollution controls is, in most instances,
based upon profit motive. The voluntary nature of the plan insures that
pollution controls will not be installed unless the investment will pro-
duce an adequate marginal return. Therefore tax incentives will only
work where there will be increased profit. The only case in which tax
incentives may work to induce investment that otherwise might not have
been made is that in which the marginal returns from investment in
pollution control as compared to a possible alternative is enhanced by
the added inducement of a tax incentive. This is not the typical situation.
The use of tax incentive legislation as a means of encouraging
industry to participate in pollution control and as a means of arousing
public interest and pressure on industry cannot be overlooked, however,
when more efficient methods are unavailable. But the problems of dis-
tinguishing between pollution control equipment and normal and neces-
sary capital expenditures make the granting of tax breaks difficult to
1973]
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administer. As a practical matter, such relief often amounts to a gift to
industry."
As noted above, the user charge, on the other hand, contains cer-
tain aspects of the effluent charge that may render the imposition of the
latter system more feasible. The following discussion details the ele-
ments of the user charge and sets forth user charge programs employed
in the United States.
User Charges
The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration has compiled
a three volume study of waste treatment in the United States." The
following discussion relies primarily on Volume III of the study.
User charges have been instituted in large part as a method of
meeting the increasing expenditures for pollution control at federal,
state and local levels. Volume III estimates that over 70 percent of
municipalities of populations 5,000 or over (as well as many with popu-
lations under 5,000) utilize such a charge system. Almost all municipali-
ties have a tap or connection fee. Municipal use of sewer service charges
also increased from 30 percent to 62 percent between the years 1953-
62. Reasons for recent expansion in adopting sewer service charges
include debt limitations placed on municipalities and restrictions on the
tax resources available to them. 0
User charges are based on varying formulae. Some municipalities
charge a flat monthly rate against all customers while others employ a
complex formula that might include the type of customer, the number
of plumbing fixtures and the quantity of water purchased. The tap or
connection fee can also be on a fixed or a formula basis. The most
widely employed methods of calculating charges are outlined below:
(1) Water use: This formula is based on a percentage of the
water bill, the volume of water used, or a combined formula
that includes both a sewer and a water charge or the volume
48. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE SECOND AN-
NUAL REPORT 141 (1971).
49. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, THE COST OF CLEAN WATER
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT (1969). The report consists of three volumes. Volume I, The Report,
updates the Department of the Interior's 1968 cost analysis. Volume II, Appendix, provides sum-
mary data from the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration's municipal waste inventories
of 1962 and 1968. Volume Ill, Sewerage Charges [hereinafter cited as Volume III], discusses the
financing of wastewater collection systems and the considerations pertinent to the selection of a
user charge program by a local governmental unit as a means of raising revenue.
50. Volume III 12-23.
[Vol. 7
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of water and characteristics of the sewage. Water use is most
frequently employed by large municipalities containing in-
dustrial complexes."'
(2) Plumbingfixtures: This method charges in relation to the
amount and type of fixtures and is not commonly utilized.
Texas may be the only state that employs this formula.,
(3) Flat rate: This method is used by the majority of cities
having a population of 5,000 or less; however, it is seldom
employed by large municipalities. Its advantage is its
simplicity; charges, however, are in no way related to costs.
This is why its use is limited most commonly to small commun-
ities where industry is slight and water uses are generally uni-
form ."
(4) Modified flat rate: This is a sophisticated version of the
flat rate that varies the charge by the type of customer. Usually
this is accomplished through the use of a system separating
users into residential, business, municipal, and light and heavy
industrial classes. The system allows a more equitable system
for the user and also an increase in revenue for the municipal-
ity. 54
(5) Sewer connection and tap fees: Nearly all municipalities
have an initial charge. The variations in method of charge
include: (a) the size of the sewer connection or water meter, (b)
the frontage, (c) the condition of the street, and (d) the location
of the customer. The charges are usually minimal.55
(6) Charges to outside customers: There has been an increase
in the amount of sewage service offered to customers outside
municipal limits. The expansion has included assumption of
city sewer functions by utility districts. Over 50 percent of
municipalities above 50,000 provide service to outside users.
Generally, however, no distinction is made between old and
new customers on a sewer addition.5"
As the above survey indicates, municipalities have found some
form of charge acceptable and necessary. This experience with user
charges should provide a significant structure on which the more sophis-
51. Id. at 16-18.
52. Id. at 19-20.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 22-23.
55. Id. at 24-25.
56. Id. at 29.
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ticated effluent charge may be imposed. It is also important to note that
the heavy discharge of effluents from industrial complexes has
prompted the employment of charges in joint treatment facilities by
municipalities and industry.
Joint Treatment and Industrial Surcharges
There has been a great expansion of the joint treatment of munici-
pal and industrial wastes due to expansion of sanitary districts and the
willingness of industry to join municipal waste teatment systems. Nor-
mal procedures for such joint treatment facilities are promulgated by
the American Public Works Association."
The regulations normally control the types of waste that are accept-
able in the treatment system. Nonacceptable waste must be given pre-
treatment. There are indications, however, that such regulations are not
vigorously enforced, with the result that industrial users are not charged
full costs." As a consequence, some municipalities incur large costs that
are passed on to local taxpayers and other users. A comprehensive
method of calculating surcharges and strict enforcement of pretreat-
ment regulations provide the only practical approach to the efficient and
beneficial use of a combined sewage treatment facility.
Surcharges are based on four formulae: the constant rate formula,
the quality-quantity formula, the California formula and the Joint Com-
mittee formula. The constant rate formula is most frequently used be-
cause of its ease of administration. Variables involved in setting the rate
include many of the features of the user charge. For example, charges
can be based on water use or type of business. There is, however, little
indication that any testing of the effluent is involved in setting the rate;
thus, the charge offers little or no inducement to business to improve
or reduce its effluent.5 9
The quality-quantity formula is employed by a small but growing
number of municipalities. It takes into account both the amount and
characteristics of the sewage and allocates costs among the actual pollu-
ters. The formula also serves as an inducement to business to improve
its own methods of pretreatment or to reduce the quantity of waste load.
However, the method involves a total administrative scheme of testing,
57. AM. PUB. WORKS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING A MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCE ON INDUSTRIAL WASTE REGULATIONS AND SURCHARGES (Special Report No. 23, Chicago
1959).
58. Volume I, supra note 49, at 10.
59. Volume 11I 29.
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enforcement and calculation of treatment charges, which impedes its
implementation in areas with inadequate technical competence. 0
The California formula looks both to flat rate charges and to
quality-quantity charges, and selects the plan that will best suit the area
in question. A third possibility in California is to use the amount of
municipal taxes paid by the business in assessing the charge.6 This
formula is "historic" because it places costs on the basis of prior classifi-
cation; it provides no equitable or realistic measure of the user's actual
share of the cost.
The Joint Committee formula is discussed in the next section.
Briefly, the formula would divide the costs into nonuser fees collected
through property taxes or special assessments and user fees assessable
through the quality-quantity formula. 2
The existence of the various charge programs just discussed has
prompted the development of various theories and methods by which the
systems might best be employed to allocate the cost burden of water
resource management. Some of these proposals are discussed below.
Division of Cost Responsibility Between Users and Nonusers
Politicians, economists, administrators and lawyers are in the fore-
front in devising methods and theories which take into account cost
assessment practices in water resource management. Each discipline
places emphasis on a particular goal, and theories vary in method of
cost allocation in proportion to the degree of emphasis placed on diverg-
ing or similar goals. The theories summarized below represent but a
sampling of plans for allocating the cost burden of water resource man-
agemeot:
(1) Public utility theory: Sewage service is conceived as a
commercial enterprise such as the production of electricity.
Rates are computed on the metered amount of water the user
consumes and the most common method of assessment is a
modified flat rate based on the classification of the user (resi-
dential, industrial, business, municipal) and on the amount of
60. Id. at 30-31. The quantity (amount of water used) and quality (type of effluents dis-
charged) formula will only be successful if specific discharge limitations are imposed. It has been
noted that industrial users can cut down on the amount of water they use and increase the amount
of wastes dumped into less water in order to decrease costs. See D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK,
WATER WASTELAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION 327 (1971).
61. Volume III 32.
62. Id.
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use. It places direct responsibility on the users of the service.13
(2) Diffused benefits theory: This theory assumes a "right to
pollute" and states that benefits are derived by all individuals,
inside and beyond the municipality, from the collection and
treatment of sanitary sewage and industrial waste. It takes all
responsibility away from the polluter and allocates costs
among the federal, state and local levels of government by
general tax levies.6 4
(3) Added expenditure theory: This theory argues that the
additional cost, once the primary function of the sewage system
is determined (whether it be storm sewage or sanitary and
business sewage), should be charged to the user."5
(4) Alternative revenue theory: This procedure arrives at the
same result as the public utility theory; it states that user
charges are more acceptable than increased property taxes."6
Stated another way, the theory looks toward the availability of
revenue and the ability to impose the cost burden on the gen-
eral public; it concludes that user charges are more economi-
cally efficient than traditional methods of taxation as well as
being more acceptable to the public.
(5) Capital and operation cost theory: This theory assigns
capital costs to nonusers (property owners who benefit from
the enhanced property value) and operating costs to users
(those who discharge wastes into the system).,7 Assignment of
costs, however, does not answer the question of how to collect
the assessments.
(6) Differential benefits theory: Here cost is divided in pro-
portion to the benefits derived from the service. The theory
would take away any direct responsibility for pollution control
from the creator of the waste. It also involves numerous com-
plex evaluations, such as assessing the cost of recreational ben-
efits or the hypothetical loss incurred if there were no service. 8
(7) Relative use theory: The system is divided into parts such
as the collection system and the treatment plant system. Costs
are then allocated on the basis of the volume of sewage flowing
through each part. 9 Nonusers would then be responsible for
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 39.
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 40-41.
69. Id. at 41.
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collection costs (storm and infiltration water) and users would
be responsible for treatment of sewage.
(8) Joint Committee theory: This theory was formulated by
representatives of eight national committees on water resource
control. It divides costs between property and users based on
annual fixed and operating costs. Fixed costs are divided into
collection, interception, pumping station and plant categories.
The costs are then allocated to user, storm water, future
growth and infiltration categories on the basis of volume and
characteristics of each type of sewage. Property is allocated the
cost for future growth, infiltration and storm water. The same
accounting methods are used for calculating operating costs.
The property share is payable through special assessments or
property taxes and the user share by user charges."0
All of the theories involve an interplay of considerations of equity,
economic efficiency, administrative simplicity and revenue adequacy.
Flat rate charges are the least equitable, provide low economic effi-
ciency, inadequate revenue, and score high only on administrative sim-
plicity. The Joint Committee formula, on the other hand, scores high
on all counts except administrative simplicity. Water use provides an
intermediate method that provides an acceptable but not wholly ade-
quate alternative to the Joint Committee theory.
It is apparent that the user charge system is widespread7 and that
attempts have been made to construct formulae by which such charges
can be better utilized. The pervasiveness of user charges, coupled with
the many features they have in common with the effluent charge, makes
the latter system a viable alternative. Advocates of the effluent charge
must be constantly alert to these similarities and utilize them to best
advantage.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to selected effluent
charge models which have been suggested, followed by a discussion of
possible modifications.
EFFLUENT CHARGE PROPOSALS
Various proposals have been advanced for implementing some
form of effluent charge system in the United States. One writer suggests
the use of broad scale planning and development of comprehensive area
70. Id. at 41-45.
71. Id. at 61-98.
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or river basin water use projects." An organization would be created
that could design a total system and authorize the allocation of costs:
This could be accomplished through various combinations of
central planning, construction, and operating facilities (dams,
sewage treatment facilities, holding lagoons, water-supply
treatment facilities, etc.) on the one hand, and a system of
charges, bounties, and regulations on the other.73
The cost of creating and maintaining a comprehensive water use project
should be distributed among those who cause the pollution and those
who benefit from its alleviation." To date, the experience of the Dela-
ware River Basin Commission, the first federal interstate compact com-
mission for the comprehensive development of a river basin, indicates
the existence of both the physical and technological capability and the
expressed desire to implement comprehensive water projects on a cost
sharing basis.
A report of the Federal Water Pollution Administration on the
Delaware River Basin represents one of the first efforts to create a
computer model upon which charges could be based." The report has
been summarized as follows:
1. Effluent charges should be seriously considered as a
method for attaining quality development;
2. Cost of waste treatment induced by a charge level will
approach the least-cost treatment plan;
3. A charge level of eight to ten cents per pound of oxygen-
demanding material discharged appears to produce relatively
large increases in critical dissolved oxygen levels;
4. A charge of that level is not expected to cause major re-
gional economic adjustments (such as the closing of industrial
plants) in the study;
5. An effluent charge method entails greater administrative
costs and management difficulties than conventional methods
of water quality improvement but the problems are not insur-
mountable and are not sufficiently great to negate the advan-
tages of the charge method;
72. A. KNEESE, WATER POLLUTION: ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 30 (1962).
73. Id.
74. A. KNEESE & B.' BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY,
INSTITUTIONS 237-38 (1968).
75. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON THE EFFLUENT
CHARGE STUDY (1966).
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6. The charge method attains the same goal as conventional
methods of improving water quality, but treatment costs are
lower, and the effect on waste dischargers is more equitable.
Also the charge provides a continuing incentive for the dischar-
ger to reduce his waste discharge and serves as a guide to public
investment decisions."
The similarity of sewer and industrial waste charges levied by munici-
palities to the effluent charge obviates any difficulties in imposing the
more comprehensive effluent charge. 71
One writer suggests a program of control based on the premise that
waste discharges upstream be cut back in a prearranged, proportional
manner during periods of low flow in order to maintain the stated
quality conditions at some downstream point of use.78 One criticism of
the plan is that it does not consider all possible economic aspects of
water use and allocation; optimum use may be sacrificed to a lesser use
of the downstream riparian when protection of the downstream ri-
parian's rights could be effected through repurification rather than pro-
hibition of waste discharges. However, the advantage of the plan is that
the effluent charge method can be used both to maintain the quality
levels prescribed by any quality control program and to encourage and
finance better economic use of water resources. 79
Regional associations for watersheds or river basins can be estab-
lished to promote comprehensive water use control, resource allocation
and pollution control programs within a single state as well. The Cali-
fornia and Delaware River Basin experiences are good examples of
comprehensive planning on both the intrastate and interstate levels.
Regardless of the model adopted, certain operational procedures
should be instituted to assure the smooth functioning of such a program
and to render it more acceptable from a political standpoint. The follow-
ing proposals are advanced as a means of accomplishing these objec-
tives.
The use of the effluent charge as a part of total water control
systems should be administered so as to correspond with the present
system of sewer and municipal waste charges. The municipality or sani-
76. See note 74 supra, at 160-61.
77. Id. at 143-72.
78. E. CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY: WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE OHIO
VALLEY UNDER AN INTERSTATE COMPACT 313-17 (1967).
79. See Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1527, 1541-44 (1970).
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tary waste district should be the conduit for moneys that relate to costs
of use and benefit to municipal facilities and residents. The state would
act as the next level of collection and distribution with power to adminis-
ter surcharges, added levies, fines and incentive plans for industrial
units. The state would act as the supervisor and regulator of both munic-
ipalities and industries. All parties should be provided with a voice in
the planning of water resource use and with a method of appeal of unfair
and inequitable actions by officials.80 Such a comprehensive system, if
it maintained sufficient technological competence, would be able to
enforce mandatory regulations, determine the amount of effluents a
particular user was adding to the waste load, and encourage and assist
users in improving techniques for pretreatment and reduction of waste
loads.
Furthermore, the diverse expertise required for equitable and eco-
nomic decision-making calls for the use of a water master or ombuds-
man on the staff of each conservancy area. The water master, acting in
an independent capacity as a protector of the rights and interests of all
parties, would serve as an informed liaison among regulatory officials
and those who use and those who benefit from the system. He would
hear evidence, make findings of fact and present his recommendations
to the appropriate board or court. An ombudsman would be able to
initiate and pursue investigations of either regulatory officials or users.
Adding a protector of the public interest to the administrative frame-
work of water regulation would contribute immeasurably to the equity
of administration and to the continued improvement of a comprehensive
water resource plan.
This same plan should be applied on the interstate level. The federal
interstate river basin compact provides a method for comprehensive
river planning in the same manner that the state conservancy district
provides a method for either intrastate rivershed or ground water use
planning. The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (OR-
SANCO) and Delaware River Basin models, allowing each state to act
as the conduit and administrator of its part of the project, are politically
feasible means of proceeding.
Water resource use, although possessing national and international
implications, is a local problem that is handled more efficiently and
flexibly at the lowest level of political administration. Regulation and
supervision, however, should be at the highest level, i.e., the federal
80. Id. at 1544-50.
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level, with a right of representation and a method of appeal available
to all affected parties. If followed, the above procedures provide an
orderly and efficient framework in which a system can operate. Further-
more, by giving a voice to all parties concerned, the possibility of ineq-
uity in the system is minimized.
CONCLUSION
The problem of water pollution in this country is fast approaching
a stage of crisis. The public is beginning to realize that clean water is
everyone's concern. As the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 indicate, this concern has instigated a concerted
quest for an efficient solution.
It is clear that water control methods which may have been ade-
quate in the past will not solve the problems of the future. It is also
apparent that the answer to water pollution abatement lies in a program
of total water control rather than piecemeal attacks. It is similarly
evident that such programs will be costly.
The United States seems ready to accept its responsibility in the
field of water resource control and allocation-as indeed it must. It is
submitted that the costs of natural resource allocation and preservation
are best shared by the general public and that, at one time or another,
each member of the public will share in the benefits of an effective
system of water purification.
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